家族企业的高管激励与研发投入关系研究——基于家族所有权和控制权视角  

Study on the Relationship Between Executive Incentive and R&D Investments of Family Firms: Based on the Family Ownership and Control Perspective

作　　者：王燕妮[1] 周琳琳[1] Wang Yanni Zhou Linlin(School of Economics and Management of Xidian University, Xi＇an 710126, China)

机构地区：[1]西安电子科技大学经济与管理学院,710126

出　　处：《南开经济研究》2016年第6期94-105,共12页Nankai Economic Studies

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"R&D资本化与费用化政策选择的中间效应研究"(71203174);西安市科技计划软科学项目"西安‘丝绸之路’经济带建设中的科技交流与合作研究"(SF1503(3))资助

摘　　要：以2010—2013年披露有研发投入且数据完整的1171家家族上市公司为样本,实证检验了家族所有权和控制权对高管激励与研发投入关系的调节作用。结果表明:(1)家族所有权是高管股权激励与研发投入关系的半调节变量,正向调节高管股权激励与研发投入的关系。家族所有权对高管薪酬激励与研发投入关系不具有调节作用。(2)家族控制权是高管股权激励与研发投入关系的同质调节变量。具体表现为:在高控制权的家族企业中,高管股权激励与研发投入负相关;而在低控制权的家族企业中,高管股权激励与研发投入正相关。家族控制权是高管薪酬激励与研发投入关系的半调节变量,负向调节高管薪酬激励与研发投入的关系。Taking 1171 listed family companies that revealed R＆D investments and complete data during 2010 and 2013 as samples, this paper uses two moderators, family ownership and family control, to empirically test their moderation of the correlation between executive incentive and R＆D investments. The results show that： （1） Family ownership is the half moderator of the relationship between executive equity incentive and R＆D investments, positively moderating their correlation, while family ownership does not moderate the relationship between executive compensation incentive and R＆D investments; （2） Family control is the homogeneous moderator of the relationship between executive equity incentive and R＆D investments. In high control family finns, executive equity incentive is negatively related to R＆D investments, while in low control family firms, executive equity incentive is positively related to R＆D investments. Family control is the half moderator of the relationship between executive compensation incentive and R＆D investments, negatively moderating their correlation.

关 键 词：家族所有权 家族控制权 高管激励 研发投入 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理] F275.5[经济管理—国民经济]