股权异质性、内部控制与上市公司投资  

Heterogeneity of Equity,Internal Control and the Investment of Listed Firms

作　　者：左拙人 胡文卿[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学商学院,江苏南京210093

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2017年第2期72-86,共15页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"内部审计设置;模式与治理效应研究"(71372033);昆明理工大学引进人才科研启动基金项目(省级)"货币政策与企业资本结构配置--基于债务异质性理论的探讨"(KKSY201508056)

摘　　要：机构投资者的"逐名"效应以及监督决策等增值性职能,有利于缓解影响上市公司投资行为与效率的信息不对称和代理问题。有限合伙制机构投资者作为异质性股权,因特殊的激励约束机制而面临双重声誉竞争,并在介入治理和监督控制被投资对象时积极注入人合性异质资源,在不同内控环境下于缓解被投资对象内外双重信息不对称、投资决策机会主义和逆向选择方面发挥特殊作用,从而通过抑制过度投资和缓解投资不足来降低被投资对象的投资扭曲程度。The grandstanding hypothesis and the institutional investors＇ value-added functions of providing professional supervi- sion and scientific decision-making can be beneficial to relieve the information asymmetry and the principal-agent issue which have influences on the investment efficiency and behaviors of listed firms. The institutional investors with limited partnership are the heterogeneous interests of listed firms, they are faced with the double reputation competition caused by the special motivation and restriction mechanism. They will also inject the heterogeneous resources which are based on human beings into investees while providing the value-added functions in order to achieve the governance interventions and supervisory control. Those above play a remarkable role of relieving the double information asymmetry of inside and outside, opportunistic behaviors and adverse selections in investment decision making in the different atmosphere of internal control. As such, the institutional investors with limited partnership can reduce the investees＇ investment distortion via two aspects which are suppressing the over-investment and the under-investment.

关 键 词：有限合伙 股权异质性 内部控制 投资效率 投资扭曲 

分 类 号：F271.5[经济管理—企业管理]