基于市场信息和对销售人员激励基础上的委托代理问题的研究  

RESEARCH ON PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM BASED ON MARKET INFORMATION AND SALESFORCE INCENTIVES

作　　者：徐鑫[1] XU Xin(Anhui University, School of Mathematics Science, Hefei 230601)

机构地区：[1]安徽大学数学科学学院,合肥230601

出　　处：《系统科学与数学》2016年第11期1921-1932,共12页Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences

基　　金：安徽大学“211”基金项目(2009QN029B);安徽大学创新团队(安徽大学A级创新团队“基础数学”发展计划);安徽省教育厅资助项目(KJ2011Z018);国家自然科学基金(70571001);高校省级优秀青年人才基金重点项目(2013SQRL005ZD)资助课题

摘　　要：销售商不仅仅是一个企业的重要组成部分,也对企业获得市场信息做出有效的决策起到至关重要的作用.文章在市场环境共享的前提下研究一个企业对两个地区销售人员的激励和补偿问题,而这两个销售人员独立地拥有影响企业生产决策的市场信息;为了能够让销售人员更加努力工作并最大程度的与企业分享他们的市场信息,文章在传统的销售竞争研究基础上首先构建了带有期望预测的补偿策略,即:让两个销售人员各自制定销售额的预测,而这些销售预测直接影响他们自己的效用;然后构建线性菜单合同下的补偿策略,即:企业给不同销售人员提供一个线性菜单合同,其所获得的补偿依据销售团队所选择的合同而决定;最后将上述的策略模型进行比较,并给出算例分析.Salespeople are not only an important part of the firms but also possess market information that is critical for a wide range of decision. This paper researches a salespeople incentives and compensation problem with two sales territories sharing a common market condition. There are two agents, one for each territory. They have private information about the market condition which is beneficial for the firm＇s decision. In order to motivate the salespeople to work hard and to share their market information with the firm. Firstly, this paper proposes a sales contest that requires them to each submit a sale forecast, these sale forecasts affect their utility values; then, this paper gives a menu of linear contracts to both agents, and his compensation is determined by his own performance according to his chosen contract. Finally, this above incentive measures and compensation schemes are compared, and an example analysis is given.

关 键 词：销售人员 激励 补偿策略 市场信息 生产计划 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]