冲突视角下大股东制衡研究——基于山水水泥控制权争夺的案例分析  

Research on Large Shareholders Balance from the Perspective of Conflict——A Case Study of Control Contest at Shanshui Cement Corporation

作　　者：夏宁[1] 陈露 

机构地区：[1]华北电力大学,102206

出　　处：《会计研究》2016年第11期46-52,共7页Accounting Research

基　　金：2015年财政部全国会计科研课题"我国管理会计信息化发展路径与机制研究"(2015KJB020);2016中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目"制度背景约束;机构投资者与公司财务效率"(2016MS71)资助

摘　　要：股东关系一直是公司治理结构中的基本问题,现有研究主要关注大股东和中小股东之间的代理关系和利益冲突,对于大股东之间冲突的研究较少。通过山水水泥的案例研究,我们发现导致其控制权争夺最突出的原因正是大股东冲突,而大股东利益诉求差异和相互不尊重不信任会直接引发冲突。研究表明:大股东冲突的成因和形成机制直接影响冲突的结果,大股东冲突破坏巨大且不能形成有效的股东制衡。山水水泥的控制权之争是我国民营企业公司治理的典型案例,对于完善股东冲突理论,有效控制或减少冲突,提高公司治理效率和保护利益相关者权益具有积极的意义。The relationship between shareholders is the basic problem in corporation governance. The existing researches mainly focus on agency relationship and interest conflict between the large and minority shareholders. However,through the case study of Shanshui Cement Corporation,we find that the interest conflict between the large shareholders is the most prominent reason for the control contest. Different interest demand as well as no mutual respect and no trust among them directly cause the conflict. Our research shows that,large shareholders conflict may not be able to form shareholder balance,meanwhile its cause and formation mechanism have direct influence on the result. The control contest at Shanshui is a typical case of private enterprise governance,and this research has a positive significance for the perfection of conflict theory,the promotion of governance efficiency and the protection of stakeholder's rights in private enterprise.

关 键 词：大股东冲突 控制权争夺 股东制衡 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理] F426.71[经济管理—国民经济]