资本结构控制权理论演进探讨  

A Discussion on the Evolution of Control Right Theory of Capital Structure

作　　者：韩俊华[1] 王宏昌[1] 韩贺洋 

机构地区：[1]安徽财经大学会计学院,安徽蚌埠233030 [2]阜阳师范学院商学院,安徽阜阳236037

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2017年第2期164-169,共6页East China Economic Management

基　　金：安徽省高校人文社会科学研究重大项目(SK2016SD02)

摘　　要：早期的资本结构控制权理论(Stulz理论、Harris&Raviv理论、Israel理论)是为了应对当时的并购浪潮,利用负债进行控制权安排的资本结构控制权理论;Stulz理论仅研究负债对控制权的影响,Harris&Raviv进一步研究了控制权对管理者行为的影响,Israel研究了负债影响现金流在股东和债权人之间的分配,三理论最大的不足是没有考虑不完全契约因素。Aghion&Bolton资本结构控制权理论引进了契约不完备,考虑了债权人利益和债务的公司治理功能,Hart资本结构控制权理论进一步构建了控制权相机转移的最优负债融资规模。国外资本结构控制权理论对中国的启示是进行混合所有制改革、完善资本市场、保护中小股东和债权人利益。Early capital structure control theories （Stulz theory, Harris ＆ Raviv theory, Israel theory） were those that dealt with the wave of mergers and acquisitions and made the arrangement of control right by optional debt at the time. Stulz only studied the impact of debt on control right, Harris ＆ Raviv further studied the impact of control right on management behavior, Israel studied the impact of debt on the distribution of cash flow between shareholders and creditors, the major deficiency of three theories is not considering the incomplete contract factors. Aghion ＆ Bolton studied the creditors＇ interests and the corporate governance function of debts from incomplete contract perspective. Hart further constructed the optimal debt financing scale of the transfer of the control right. The revelation of foreign capital structure control theories to China is that carrying oat mixed ownership reform, perfecting the capital market, protecting the interests of minority shareholders and creditors.

关 键 词：控制权 资本结构 要约收购 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]