保鲜努力下的鲜活农产品收益共享机制研究  

Research on Revenue-Sharing Mechanism in the Fresh Agriculture Product Based on the Freshness-Keeping Effort

作　　者：王永明[1] 秦翠平[1] WANG Yongming QIN Cuiping(Faculty of Management and Economics, Kunming University of Science and Technology, Kunming 65009)

机构地区：[1]昆明理工大学管理与经济学院,昆明650093

出　　处：《科技与经济》2017年第1期51-55,共5页Science & Technology and Economy

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目--"基于灰色系统理论的鲜活农产品供应链博弈均衡研究--构建科学的鲜活农产品供应链体系"(项目编号:71262029;项目负责人:王永明)成果之一;国家自然科学基金项目--"基于尖端博弈论的安全食品供应链控制理论与保障机制研究"(项目编号:71362030;项目负责人:王永明)成果之一

摘　　要：针对单个供应商和零售商构成的二级鲜活农产品供应链,建立了考虑保鲜努力水平的3种博弈模型:合作博弈模型、供应商主导和零售商主导的Stackberg博弈模型。比较分析了3种决策顺序对供应商、零售商和供应链的影响。并进一步针对供应商主导的Stackberg博弈模型,证明传统的收益共享契约无法实现供应链协调,提出了基于努力成本分担的协调机制。研究表明:当收益共享和成本分担比例满足一定条件时,供应链可实现协调。最后通过数值分析验证模型的有效性和科学性。This paper studies a two-stage fresh agricultural product supply chain consisting of single supplier and retailer, consider- ing the freshness-keeping effortcooperative game model, Stackberg game model led by supplier and retailers are established. And the pa- per analyzes the effects of the three decision sequences on the supplier, the retailer and the supply chain. Furthermore, aiming to the Stackberg game model led by suppliers, it proves that the traditional revenue-sharing contract cannot realize coordination of the supply chain, and it establishes a coordination mechanism with effort cost sharing. The research shows that when the proportion of revenue- sharing and cost sharing meets certain conditions, the supply chain can achieve coordination. At last, the numerical simulation results show the effectiveness and scientificity of the models.

关 键 词：鲜活农产品 保鲜努力 博弈模型 收益共享机制 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] F323.7[经济管理—国民经济]