碳税返还比例、政府补贴与企业减排决策  被引量:2

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作  者:周维良[1,2] 刘敏[1] 

机构地区:[1]珠海城市职业技术学院经济管理学院 [2]暨南大学经济学院

出  处:《企业经济》2017年第2期22-28,共7页Enterprise Economy

基  金:国家自然科学基金项目“环境倾销与环境管制的博弈分析、效应比较与策略选择”(项目编号:71273114);珠海市金湾区社会科学“十二五”规划课题“低碳供应链中政府补贴的运用--以通航产业为例”(项目编号:201540)

摘  要:为了探究中央政府碳税政策下地方政府补贴决策与企业减排决策的互动关系,本文构建了一个三阶段动态博弈模型,采用逆向归纳法求解三者间的博弈均衡解,分析各自的最优决策及影响因素。研究发现,中央政府的最优决策为碳税收入中自留部分不宜超过6/7成,其余的尽可能返还给地方政府。地方政府的最优补贴策略应对减排困难达到一定程度的企业才提供补贴。企业的最优减排决策取决于自身减排难度,而不依赖于地方政府的减排补贴。建议政府建立灵活的财政转移支付制度来缓解统一碳税和区域经济发展不平衡的矛盾;在统一碳税税率的前提下根据行业减排难度,灵活调整返还比例和补贴数额,照顾重点排污企业;循序渐进地使用专项补贴,促进企业研发和应用环保技术。In order to explore the interactive relationship between the local government's decision on subsidies and corporate decision on emission reduction under central government carbon tax policy, this paper constructs a three-stage dynamic game model, acquire the game equilibrium solution by backward induction method to discuss their optimum decision-making strategy and impact factors. It is found that the central government's carbon tax return proportion should be below six-seventh, and the remainder should be returned to the local government as much as possible. The local government's optimum strategy is to provide carbon emission reduction subsidies only when the enterprise's emission reduction difficulty reaches at some ex- tent, and the enterprise's optimum emission reduction strategy is dependent on its emission reduction difficulty instead of the local government's emission reduction subsides. It is suggested that the government shall ease the contradiction be- tween the unified carbon taxation rate and the unbalanced regional development by setting up the flexible transfer payment system, adjusting the incoming carbon return proportion and subsidies amount according to industry emission reduction status under the premise of unified carbon taxation rate. Thus the key pollution firms shall be treated preferentially so as to avoid over much quantity loss, push up the firm to go on with R&D and application of environment protection technology.

关 键 词:碳税 减排与补贴决策 三阶段博弈 减排难度 

分 类 号:F270[经济管理—企业管理]

 

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