有限理性条件下演化博弈行为分析  

Behavior Analysis of Evolutionary Game Under the Condition of Bounded Rationality

作　　者：路璐[1] 冯素芬[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京工业职业技术学院基础教育学院,北京100042

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2017年第1期221-228,共8页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

摘　　要：基于博弈双方有限理性的假设,运用动力系统的相关理论和方法对一般2×2非对称演化博弈过程建立了动态复制方程,并对博弈双方在演化过程中的行为进行了分析,得出博弈双方交互系统均衡点及稳定性相应的结论及其全部动力学行为.Based on the both players with bounded rationality of the game,this paper applied the theory of dynamic system to establish replicator dynamics equation for 2x2 asymmetric evolutionary game.And analysised the behavior of both players in evolutionary game respectively.Then we discussed the equilibrium points and the stability of the two parties and obtained all behavior of dynamics.

关 键 词：演化博弈 有限理性 复制动态方程 演化稳定策略 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]