国有企业党组织治理的信号传递效应——基于审计师选择的分析  

The Signaling Effect of Party Organization Governance in SOEs:Analysis Based on Auditor Choice

作　　者：程博[1] 宣扬[1] 潘飞[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学会计学院,上海200433 [2]上海财经大学会计与财务研究院,上海200433

出　　处：《财经研究》2017年第3期69-80,共12页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社科重点研究基地重大项目(15JJD630008);国家自然科学基金项目(71372039);上海财经大学创新团队支持计划的资助

摘　　要：党组织通过"双向进入、交叉任职"参与国有企业经营决策是我国特有的制度安排,这一制度安排是否会增加国有企业对高质量审计的需求?文章以2006-2012年国有A股上市公司为研究对象,从信号传递的角度研究了国有企业党组织治理如何影响其审计师选择。研究结果表明,存在"交叉任职"的国有上市公司倾向于选择规模较大的会计师事务所,且这一现象在公司业绩较好以及党委书记政治升迁动机较强时更加明显,从而验证了国有企业党组织治理的信号传递效应。文章的发现丰富了嵌于企业政治行为的中国特色公司治理理论,扩展了现有文献,同时具有一定的政策启示。It is a distinctive institution that party organization members participate in operation and governance decisions by two-way access and cross appointment in stateowned enterprises（SOEs hereafter）.Does this institutional arrangement increase SOEs＇ demand for high-quality auditing？Using the sample of SOEs in A-share stock market from2006 to 2012,this paper studies how party organization governance of SOEs influences auditor choice from a perspective of signaling.Results suggest that the SOEs with＂cross appointment＂tend to choose bigger auditing firms,and this effect is more salient when the performance of companies is better or the incentive of political promotion is stronger,thereby confirming the signaling hypothesis.Our results enrich Chinese distinctive theory of corporate governance embedded in firm political behavior expand current literature,and also have some certain policy implications.

关 键 词：党组织治理 交叉任职 国有企业 审计师选择 

分 类 号：F239[经济管理—会计学]