食品安全“监管困局”、信号扭曲与制度安排  

The “regulation dilemma” signal skew and institution arrangement in food safety

作　　者：谢康[1] 肖静华[1] 赖金天 李新春[1] 乌家培[2] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学管理学院,广州510275 [2]国家信息中心,北京100045

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2017年第2期1-17,共17页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助重大项目(14ZDA074);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71371198)

摘　　要：在既有研究提出的食品安全"监管困局"现象基础上,通过仿真建模及分析进一步解剖该困局的动态形成过程,构建食品市场中生产者、消费者和监管者构成的两期博弈模型,剖析食品安全"监管困局"的内在形成机理.研究发现:1)加大监管力度形成的违规揭露信息会影响到消费者的支付预期,当违规揭露水平超过消费者心理承受时会降低消费者的支付水平,进而影响食品行业平均收益,导致生产经营者的超额违规收益迅速增大,反过来又增强了生产经营者的违规动机,是为食品安全"监管困局"的动态形成过程;2)食品安全"监管困局"在于监管者与企业、监管者与消费者两种信息结构使监管力度的信号被扭曲所致,即政府监管力度对消费者形成信号扭曲,消费者无法通过市场价格实现质量信号分离,从而降低支付水平而影响行业平均收益.本文由此提出针对性的制度安排.This paper analyzes the dynamic process of the ＂regulation dilemma＂ of food safety proposed by recent studies through simulation modeling. The two-period game model includes the food producer, consumers, and regulators and analyzes the forming mechanism of the ＂regulation dilemma＂. The result shows that the de- gree of regulation will influence the expected payoff of consumers and that the overall income in the food mar- ket will decrease when the regulation degree exceeds the consumers＇ expectation payoff so that the violation in- come will definitely increase. In return, the increase of violation income will enhance the violation motives. The result also suggests that the reason for the ＂regulation dilemma＂ is that the signal of the regulation power is skewed by the signal structures between regulators and enterprises and that between regulators and consum- ers. In other words, the regulation powers skew the consumer＇ s signal, so that consumers can not judge the quality of the signal by the market price, as decreases the payoff and market income. In the end, this paper suggests some institutional solutions.

关 键 词：食品安全 监管困局 信号扭曲 消费者支付 仿真分析 制度安排 

分 类 号：F420[经济管理—产业经济]