异地独董、履职职能与公司过度投资  

A Study on Nonlocal Independent Directors,Duties and Corporate Overinvestment

作　　者：曹春方[1] 林雁[1] Cao Chunfang Lin -Yan(School of Accounting, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics School of Accounting, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics)

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学会计学院

出　　处：《南开管理评论》2017年第1期16-29,131,共15页Nankai Business Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71672151);教育部人文社会科学青年基金项目(13XJC630001)资助

摘　　要：本文基于过度投资这一较为全面的公司决策视角,以2001-2013年A股主板上市公司为样本,提出异地独董的"咨询有效"、"咨询无效"和"监督无效"三种假说检验异地独董对公司整体投资的作用。研究发现:(1)异地独董导致了公司更严重的过度投资,该结论在考虑内生性及多种稳健性之后仍然成立,以此拒绝"咨询有效"假说;(2)从公司监督需求和咨询需求区分考察失效职能的结果表明,异地独董在公司整体层面主要表现为"监督无效";(3)进一步分析显示,路径上,异地独董的履职失效源于更低的董事会出席率、公司更高的电话会议比例和公司面临的较差的信息环境。后果上,异地独董导致的过度投资降低了公司价值;而异地独董的差异也并非个体系统性偏差,相同独董的异地任职比本地任职导致了更严重的过度投资;忙碌、非职业背景、非学术背景和年龄较轻的异地独董对过度投资的影响更强。Current literatures consider that non-local independent directors （NIDs） could offer good consulting service rather than monitoring, but from the general angle, the issue of whether NIDs are good or bad for corporate governance still remains unsolved. This study explores the above-mentioned issue from overinvestment, a more comprehensive angle, and posits hypotheses of ＂Consulting Efficient＂, ＂Monitoring Inefficient＂ and ＂Consulting Inefficient＂. By employing sample of listed companies on Chinese main board from 2001-2013, we mainly find that, the more the ratio of NIDs in the board, the severer the overinvestment of the firm, and this result is still holding up after considering alternative measurement, omitted variables, endogenous problems, self-selection and other robustness tests, therefore we rule out ＂Consulting Efficient＂ assumption. After distinguishing which function is inefficient, we further find that the above effect mainly attributes to the inefficiency of NIDs＇ monitor- ing. To be specific, in the firms with high monitoring needs, the effect that nonlocal directors increase overinvestment is more significant, yet the consulting role does not significantly work on worsening or el- evating overinvestment of the firm. Additional analyses suggest that, the under-expected performance of NIDs still manifests on the low board meeting attendance and the more frequent conference calls of the firm; because of the disadvantages in acquiring information, the above effect is more significant when firms are located in areas where information environment is less-developed; consequently, NIDs lead to the decline of firm value. After considering individual-level characteristics, our analysis finds that the busy, non-professional, non-academic and the younger NIDs play a major role on worsening the corporation overinvestment. This study investigates the effect that the independent directors exert on the firm＇s overinvestment from the geographic angle, thus not only extending and enriching the

关 键 词：异地独立董事 过度投资 监督 咨询 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济]