投资者法律保护与企业的盈余管理——基于应计项目操控和真实活动操控的研究  

Legal Investor Protection and Earnings Management——Based on Manipulations of Accruals and Real Activities

作　　者：李增福[1] 曾慜[1] 

机构地区：[1]华南师范大学经济与管理学院,广州510006

出　　处：《管理评论》2017年第2期221-233,共13页Management Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71172198)

摘　　要：投资者法律保护制度的加强是否抑制了企业盈余管理?本文以中国A股上市公司为样本,基于应计项目和真实活动两种盈余操控模式对这一问题进行了考察。但两种模式却得出了完全迥异的结论,即投资者保护法律制度在降低了应计项目盈余管理的同时,提高了真实活动盈余管理;进一步的研究发现这一结论仅存在于国有企业。本文的发现拓展了对资者法律保护与企业盈余管理的研究,也对投资者保护制度的进一步完善和国有企业的改革有一定的借鉴意义。Will the strengthening of legal investor protection strengthen inhibit enterprises＇ earnings management？ This paper investigates both the accrual and real-based earning management activities based on a sample of the listed firms in China. But the two models reach totally different conclusions,i.e. legal investor protection has a negative impact on accruals manipulation,but has a positive impact on real earnings management. Further study finds that it is mainly to promote the state-controlled firms＇ real earnings management,but has no significant impact on the non-state-controlled firms＇ real earnings management. This finding expands the research of legal investor protection and enterprises＇ earnings management,and also provides some reference for the improvement of legal investor protection and the reform of state-controlled firms.

关 键 词：国有控股 非国有控股 投资者法律保护 应计项目盈余管理 真实活动盈余管理 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]