基于合作博弈模型的不当解雇赔偿机制研究  

Study on Unlawful Dismissal Compensation Based on a Cooperative Game Model

作　　者：左春玲[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京物资学院劳动科学与法律学院

出　　处：《中国人力资源开发》2017年第3期154-160,共7页Human Resources Development of China

摘　　要：在中国,不当解雇引起的赔偿金争议日益增多。本文首先对美、英、法、德四国相关规制进行比较研究,分析并总结出不当解雇赔偿需经劳雇双方博弈来确定赔偿责任和赔偿标准的内在运行机制。以诺基亚(苏州)不当解雇赔偿案例为引导,基于一个合作博弈分析,得出赔偿金数额的大小受劳雇双方赔偿金谈判的风险偏好影响等结论。In China, collective disputes on unlawful dismissal compensation resulted from lock-out or workplace relocation are increasing. However a reasonable compensatory standard doesn＇ t take shape because regulations in Labor Contract Law of PRC don＇ t reflect the formation mechanism of compensation accurately. The paper try to make a case study based on a cooperative game model, and draw the conclusion that it is risk preference of bargaining parities impacts the compensatory amoBnt.

关 键 词：不当解雇赔偿 合作博弈 风险偏好 

分 类 号：D922.52[政治法律—民商法学]