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作 者:邢维全[1,2] XING Weiquan(School of Business, Tianjin University of Finance & Economics, Tianjin 300222, China The Joint Postdoctoral Workstation of Auditing Department and the Renmin University of China, Beijing 100086, China)
机构地区:[1]天津财经大学商学院,天津300222 [2]审计署与中国人民大学联合博士后工作站,北京100086
出 处:《河南工业大学学报(社会科学版)》2017年第2期18-25,共8页Journal of Henan University of Technology:Social Science Edition
基 金:2014年教育部人文社会科学研究青年项目(14YJC630048);2015年国家自然科学基金青年项目(71502122)
摘 要:基于深交所信息披露考评数据,研究了控制权强度与政治关联的交互作用对民营上市公司信息透明度的影响。结果表明,只有在实际控制人的控制权强度较低时,民营上市公司高管的政治关联才会提升企业信息披露质量;同时,只有在没有政治关联的民营企业,实际控制人的控制权强度与企业的信息披露质量才会呈现正相关关系。既拓展了已有政治关联与信息透明度之间关系的研究,开展了对企业决策权配置经济后果的研究。As a kind of corporate governance, the relationship between the intensity of control power and the transparency of information is rather complex. Based on the data of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange Information Disclosure Evaluation, the article studies the influence of the interaction between the intensity of control power and political connections on the transparency of private listed companies. The results show that only when the actual controllerg intensity of control power is low, will the political relevance of the executives of private listed companies enhance the quality of information disclosure ; meanwhile, only in the absence of political relevance of private enterprises, will the actual controllerg intensity of control power have a positive correlation with the quality of information disclosure. Greater importance should be attached by capital market supervision to the supervision of information transparency for those companies with a higher degree of ownership control and polit- ical connections.
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