不对称信息下供应链赊销交易中的激励契约  

Incentive contract in supply chain trade credit under asymmetric information

作　　者：程红[1] 汪贤裕[2] 颜锦江[2] 

机构地区：[1]成都理工大学管理科学学院,成都610059 [2]四川大学商学院,成都610065

出　　处：《控制与决策》2017年第3期570-576,共7页Control and Decision

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71502037;71501161);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(14YJC630020;15YJC630149);成都理工大学优秀科研团队资助项目(KYTD201406)

摘　　要：赊销交易中,若零售商的销售能力是私人信息,则供应商的赊销风险将增加.为给供应商提供甄别零售商销售能力的方法和依据以控制赊销风险,运用激励理论构建激励模型并求解得到激励契约,将其与对称信息下赊销交易和不对称信息下现金交易中的激励契约进行比较.结果表明,该激励契约能够甄别零售商的能力,不对称信息下的产品交易量均向下扭曲,赊销交易能够减轻产品交易量的扭曲程度和降低甄别成本.最后通过算例分析验证了主要结论.In trade credit, supplier＇s credit risk will be increased when retailer＇s sales ability is his private information.In order to help the supplier screen retailer＇s sales ability types, an inventive model is built by using the incentive theory,and the incentive contract is obtained by solving it, which is compared with the contracts in trade credit under symmetric information and in cash trade under asymmetric information separately.Results show that, this incentive contract can screen the retailer＇s type, volumes of transactions are twisted down under the asymmetric information, and the distortion rate and the cost of screening are reduced in trade credit.Finally, a case study verifies the main conclusions.

关 键 词：赊销 供应链 不对称信息 激励理论 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]