国有企业董事会党组织治理、董事会非正式等级与公司绩效  

Governance of State-owned Companies' Party Organization,Board Informal Hierarchy and Company's Performance

作　　者：黄文锋[1] 张建琦[2] 黄亮[3] HUANG Wen-feng ZHANG Jian-qi HUANG Liang(International School of Business ＆ Finance, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, Guangdong, 510275, China Lingnan College, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, Guangdong, 510275, China School of Business Administration, Guangdong University of Finance ＆ Economics, Guangzhou, Guangdong, 510320, China)

机构地区：[1]中山大学国际金融学院,广东广州510275 [2]中山大学岭南学院,广东广州510275 [3]广东财经大学工商管理学院,广东广州510320

出　　处：《经济管理》2017年第3期6-20,共15页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"资源驱动型拼凑对机会辨识与创新绩效作用机制研究"(71572204);国家自然科学基金项目"真实型领导对员工创新行为影响的多层次分析"(71202100)

摘　　要：如何发挥党的领导在我国国有企业的独特优势,通过党的领导完善国有企业的公司治理是我国当前国有企业改革发展面临的重大问题之一。然而,作为党的领导的重要体现与重点,我国国有企业董事会党组织治理如何影响国有企业尚未得到充分的揭示与验证。本文首次基于团队非正式社会结构的视角,集中研究我国国有企业董事会党组织治理对董事会非正式等级的影响,进而探究董事会非正式等级与公司绩效之间的关系及其情景边界。基于我国国有上市公司的研究实证结果表明,董事会党组织治理对董事会非正式等级平等化具有显著的正向影响,但一般情况下,董事会非正式等级平等化对公司绩效的正向影响却不显著。进一步的研究发现,只有在面临高环境不确定性时,国有企业董事会非正式等级平等化才正向显著影响公司绩效。研究结果具有较好的稳健性,其揭示了国有企业组织内部运作机制能够为创新国有企业党组织发挥政治核心作用的途径与方式提供重要的机会,而国有企业党组织优势在董事会的发挥单凭"双向进入、交叉任职"的形式仍不够充分,还需与组织内外部环境相匹配。The governance involvement of communist party is the distinguishing characteristic of state-owned enterprises in China. How communist party exert its special advantages in state-owned enterprises in order to com- bine the leadership of the communist party and the promotion of corporate governance is a big issue of Chinese state- owned enterprise reform. Existing research shows that the governance of state-owned companies＇ party organization has a significant impact on state-owned enterprises＇ strategic behavior and performance. Scholars have recognized the value of studying the informal hierarchies on corporate boards that base on directors＇ deference for one another and thought it to play the critical roles in corporate governance mechanism and firm＇ s performance. However, the linkage between governance of state-owned companies＇ party organization and board informal hierarchy has not be- ing fully uncovered. Based on the perspective of group informal social structure, this paper focus on the effect that the governance of state-owned companies＇ party organization brings to the board informal hierarchy so as to further study the relation between board informal hierarchy and company＇ s performance. The paper argue that governance involvement of communist party can affect implicit rank order of individuals within state-owned enterprises＇ board- room with respect to a valued social dimension and hinder the clarity of the board informal hierarchy due to political advantage of communist party and its＇ responsibility to be one of key stakeholders, and low clarity of the board in- formal hierarchy enhances the functioning of board of directors＇ governance such as coordination, motivation and conflict, thereby improve the likelihood of the board＇ s contributing productively to the firm＇ s performance. The pa- per further suggest that such a positive relationship between board informal hierarchy and the firm＇ s performance is likely to be contingent on environment uncertainty. Specifically, the p

关 键 词：国有企业 党组织治理 董事会非正式等级 公司绩效 环境不确定性 

分 类 号：C936[经济管理—管理学]