考虑参考价格效应的企业合作创新行为博弈  

Game on Firms' Cooperative Innovation Behavior with Reference-price Effects

作　　者：宋建[1] 梁樑[1] 孙加森[2] 

机构地区：[1]中国科学技术大学管理学院,安徽合肥230026 [2]苏州大学东吴商学院,江苏苏州215021

出　　处：《系统工程》2016年第11期105-111,共7页Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重大国际合作项目(71110107024);国家自然科学基金青年科学基金资助项目(71501139);江苏省自然科学基金资助项目(BK20150307)

摘　　要：构建一个上游为垄断的中间产品供应商,下游为单个独立的最终产品制造商的纵向供应链结构,旨在研究参考价格效应影响下的企业纵向合作创新行为。研究发现:参考价格效应对供应链参与企业的创新投资具有积极的推动作用;贯序行动博弈情形下,供应商的创新投资策略受到制造商对其研发支出补贴政策的影响,而该补贴政策则取决于合作双方边际收益的比值;集中决策过程中,供应链参与企业进行创新投资时往往会考虑其合作伙伴的边际收益;上、下游企业间实行纵向一体化,能够有效刺激制造商和供应商的合作创新投资,从而实现供应链系统整体利润最大化。In order to study the firms＇ vertical co-op innovation behavior under reference-price effect,this paper constructs a vertical supply chain,where a supplier as the upstream monopolizes intermediate products to the downstream,and an independent manufacturer producing termination products.There are four main findings in this paper.Firstly,the reference-price effect plays a positive role in the firms＇ innovation investment of a supply chain.Secondly,the supplier＇s innovation effort is influenced by the manufacturer＇s support policy under Stackelberg structure,and this support policy is determined by the comparison between two partners＇ marginal benefits.Thirdly,in the scenario of the centralized,firms always consider cooperators＇ marginal benefits when making decisions on innovation in a supply chain.Lastly,the vertical channel integration can stimulate both the manufacturer＇s and supplier＇s investments on co-op innovation,which in turn maximizes the overall profit of the supply chain system.

关 键 词：供应链 制造商 供应商 合作创新 博弈 参考价格效应 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]