考虑损失规避与质量水平的供应链协调契约模型  

Supply chain coordination contract model considering loss aversion and quality level

作　　者：刘云志[1] 樊治平[1] Liu Yunzhi Fan Zhiping(School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110167, China)

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳110167

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2017年第1期89-102,共14页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71271051);中央高校基本科研业务经费资助项目(N140607001;N130606001)

摘　　要：针对考虑损失规避型零售商与产品质量水平的二级供应链协调问题,分别分析了分散供应链情形下供应商与损失规避型零售商的最优策略和集中供应链情形下供应链的最优策略,并构建了回购–质量成本分担契约下的供应链协调契约模型,并且证明了该供应链协调契约模型的有效性.通过博弈分析可得到的结论是:损失规避型零售商订货量的增加会促使供应商提高其产品质量水平以便保持市场竞争优势,而供应商的产品质量水平的提高能够促使损失规避型零售商增加其订货量;回购契约不能协调此二级供应链;一定条件下回购–质量成本分担契约能够协调此二级供应链.此外,在分散供应链和集中供应链情形下,通过数值实验分析了模型参数变化对供应商和零售商的最优策略以及供应链利润的影响.In a two-stage supply chain coordination problem with loss-averse retailer and quality level, this paper analyzes the optimal strategies under the decentralized and integrated supply chain, respectively. A supply chain coordination contract model is constructed by combining the buyback contract and the quality cost sharing contract, and the validity of the model is proven. By the game analysis, several results are obtained： The increase in the loss-averse retailer＇s order quantity will prompt the improvement of the supplier＇s quality level to maintain the supplier＇s competitive advantage, while the improvement of the supplier＇s quality level will increase the loss-averse retailer＇s order quantity; the buyback contract cannot coordinate the two-stage supply chain; the contract combined the buyback contract and quality cost sharing contract can coordinate the two-stage supply chain under certain conditions. Furthermore, under both the decentralized and integrated supply chain, the impacts of the changes of the parameters in the model on the optimal strategies of supplier and retailer and the profits of supply chain are presented through a sensitivity analysis of the parameters.

关 键 词：供应链协调 损失规避质量水平 回购-质量成本分担契约 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]