终极控制股东对零杠杆政策选择的影响:掏空抑或支持?  

The Effects of Ultimate Controlling Shareholders on Zero-leverage Policy: Tunneling or Propping?

作　　者：黄珍[1,2] 李婉丽[1,2] 高伟伟[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院,陕西西安710049 [2]西安交通大学过程控制与效率工程教育部重点实验室,陕西西安710049

出　　处：《西安交通大学学报（社会科学版）》2017年第2期24-31,99,共9页Journal of Xi'an Jiaotong University：Social Sciences

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究西部和边疆地区青年基金项目(14XJC790001)

摘　　要：在国内外资本市场上,选择零杠杆政策的公司均呈现出逐年显著增长的趋势。为此,以2007-2013年沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,基于掏空和支持的视角,研究了终极控制股东对上市公司零杠杆政策选择的影响。研究发现:终极控制股东的掏空行为(两权分离度)会降低上市公司的零杠杆政策选择;而支持行为(现金流权)会增加上市公司选择零杠杆政策的可能性。进一步分析大股东利益侵占的中介效应发现,大股东利益侵占在掏空行为与零杠杆政策选择,以及支持行为与零杠杆政策选择之间起到了一定的传导机制。The number of companies which choose zero leverage policies in capital markets both at home and abroad, is showing an increasing trend year by year. Therefore, this paper, taking A share listed companies both in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2007 to 2013 as samples, based on ultimate controlling shareholders＇ motivation of tunneling and prop- ping, examines the effects of ultimate controlling shareholders on zero - leverage policy. The results show that： （ 1 ） The ultimate controlling shareholders＇ separation of ownership rights and control rights is negatively correlated with zero- le- verage policy, indicating that the greater divergence of ownership - control rights is, the lower possibility of choosing ze- ro - leverage policy is. On the contrary, the greater cash - flow rights is, the higher possibility of choosing zero - lever- age policy is. （2） The benefits expropriation of large shareholders is an intermediary variable between ultimate control- ling shareholders＇ tunneling or propping and zero -leverage policy.

关 键 词：终极控制股东 掏空行为 支持行为 零杠杆政策 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]