传统品牌与网货品牌竞争下的多渠道供应链定价研究  

Research on the Pricing of Multi-channel Supply Chain Under the Competition Between the Traditional Brand and the Net Goods Brand

作　　者：李景峰[1] 张文静[1] 毋江波[1] Li Jingfeng Zhang Wenjing Wu Jiangbo(Shanxi University, Taiyuan 030006, Chin)

机构地区：[1]山西大学,太原030006

出　　处：《工业技术经济》2017年第3期107-115,共9页Journal of Industrial Technological Economics

基　　金：国家社会基金项目(项目编号:14BTQ027)

摘　　要：基于传统制造商品牌的双渠道供应链,引入网货品牌的网络直销渠道,构建了两个品牌竞争下的多渠道供应链定价模型。并考虑了两条网络渠道的双重搭便车行为,通过Nash博弈得到供应链成员在分散和集中式决策下的均衡策略。研究表明各博弈方的最优定价和利润是关于渠道间及品牌间交叉价格弹性系数的增函数,且渠道竞争的影响显著于品牌竞争;两个制造商的搭便车行为与自身的最优定价和利润呈正相关,但它们的相互影响取决于直接价格弹性系数;搭便车行为对零售商是不利的。最后采用价格加成契约来协调多渠道供应链,以弥补分散决策下双重边际效应带来的损失。Based on the dual channel supply chain of the traditional brand, the net goods brand network direct selling charmel is in- troduced, and the pricing model of the multi - channel supply chain under the competition of the two brands is constructed. And taking in- to account the double free riding behavior of two network channels, the optimal pricing and profit of supply chain members in decentralized and centralized decision - making are obtained through the Nash game. The results show that the optimal pricing and profit of the game is the increasing function of the channel cross price elasticity and cross price elasticity coefficient of the brand influence and channel competi- tion, significantly in brand competition; two manufacturers of free riding behavior and its optimal pricing and profit is positively related, but they affect each other directly depends on the price elasticity coefficient; free riding behavior is detrimental to the retailer. Finally, the price addition contract is adopted to realize the coordination of multi - channel supply chain, in order to make up the loss caused by the double marginal effect of decentralized decision.

关 键 词：多渠道供应链 双重搭便车行为 定价策略 价格加成契约 参数敏感性 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]