考虑损失规避与产品质量水平的供应链协调契约模型  

Supply Chain Coordination Contract Model Considering Loss Aversion and Quality Level

作　　者：刘云志[1,2] 樊治平[2] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学工程管理学院,江苏南京210093 [2]东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳110167

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2017年第1期65-77,共13页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71271051);中央高校基本科研业务经费资助项目(N140607001;N130606001)

摘　　要：供应链的整体协调和产品质量水平是取得供应链竞争优势的关键,因此关于考虑产品质量水平的供应链协调问题的研究是值得关注的。本文着重研究了考虑损失规避与产品质量水平的二级供应链协调问题,在零售商存在损失规避行为的假设下,依据Wang和Webster给出的损失规避效用函数刻画了零售商的损失规避行为,通过分析分别得到了分散式决策下供应商与损失规避型零售商的最优策略和集中式决策下供应链的最优策略,同时分析了二级供应链在批发价格契约下的协调情况,并构建了批发价格-质量成本分担契约下的供应链协调契约模型,且论证了该供应链协调契约模型的有效性。通过分析得到的主要结论是:在分散式决策下,供应商的产品质量水平为损失规避型零售商的订货量的严格递增函数,损失规避型零售商的订货量为供应商的产品质量水平的严格递增函数;在集中式决策下,供应商的产品质量水平为零售商的订货量的严格递增函数,零售商的订货量为供应商的产品质量水平的严格递增函数;批发价格契约不能协调此二级供应链;一定条件下批发价格-质量成本分担契约能够协调此二级供应链。此外,在分散和集中式决策下,通过数值实验分析了模型参数变化对最优产品质量水平与最优订货量的影响。所得研究结论对于相关供应链管理者或成员具有一定的参考价值。Supply chain coordination and quality level are two crucial facts for supply chain to obtain a competitive advantage.Therefore,it is necessary to explore and analyze the supply chain coordination problem considering the quality level.In this paper,the two-stage supply chain coordination problem considering loss aversion and quality level is investigated.Based on loss-averse retailer assumption,the loss aversion of retailer is portrayed by the loss-averse utility given by Wang and Webster～（[31]）.Then,the optimal strategies of the supplier and the loss-averse retailer are analyzed at the decentralized supply China respectively.And the optimal strategies of the supplier and the retailer are analyzed at the centralized supply chain respectively.Meanwhile,the two-stage supply chain coordination problem with the wholesale price contract is studied.Further,a supply chain coordination contract model is constructed by combining the wholesale price contract and the quality cost sharing contract,and the validity of the model is proven.Through the analysis,the several conclusions are obtained as follows：under the decentralized supply chain,the supplier＇s quality level strictly increases with the loss-averse retailer＇s order quantity,and the loss-averse retailer＇s order quantity strictly increases with the supplier＇s quality level;under the centralized supply chain,the supplier＇s quality level strictly increases with the retailer＇s order quantity,and the retailer＇s order quantity strictly increases with the supplier＇s quality level;the wholesale price contract cannot coordinate the two-stage supply chain;the contract combined the wholesale price contract and the quality cost sharing contract can coordinate the two-stage supply chain under certain conditions.Furthermore,under the decentralized and centralized supply chain,the impacts of the changes of the parameters in the model on the optimal quality level and order quantity are presented through the sensitivity analysis of the parameters.The research

关 键 词：供应链协调 损失规避 质量水平 契约模型 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] C931[经济管理—国民经济]