实证研究下的竞业禁止制度二象性与立法取向  

An Empirical Study on the Prohibition of Business Strife Duality and Legislative Orientation

作　　者：金灵[1] JIN Ling(International School of Financial Law, East China University of Political Science and Law, Shanghai 200042, Chin)

机构地区：[1]华东政法大学国际金融法律学院,中国上海200042

出　　处：《上海商学院学报》2017年第1期64-71,87,共9页Business Economic Review

摘　　要：离任董事同业竞争、侵夺公司利益之行为虽在公司法与劳动法共同涵摄范围之内,但是不论公司法忠实义务还是劳动合同竞业禁止条款往往都难以很好地规制。分析中国大陆既往判例发现离任股东涉诉案件稀少、原告获救济难度大,整体特征体现董事对公司"要挟"现象严重,具体表现为:一,涉诉董事为公司内部关系人,事后提起诉讼难;二,大多涉诉董事基于股东-董事双重身份,在缔结劳动合同时为强势一方,"竞业禁止"条款难以订入合同;三,以《公司法》第一百四十八条提起忠实义务之诉并无具体规范指引,法院难以断决。基于上述特征,大陆宜采取台湾地区改革路径,将经理人竞业禁止条款从劳动合同中提取并加入公司章程,避免董事与公司谈判时的要挟现象。Such departure directors＇behaviors as horizontal competition and usurping corporate opportunities are subject to the company law and labor law,while the duty of loyalty and the prohibition of business strife not always achieve expected goals.The empirical study concludes that few case affixed legal liability of departure director and remedy was really difficult to obtain,especially showing in the following phenomenon：1）litigationrelated directors were always the insider of the company;2）because of the identity of director,few labor contract had prohibition of business strife＇s term;3）article one hundred and forty-eight of the Company Law,relating the duty of loyalty proceeding,wasn＇t specific enough.It＇s necessary for the mainland to follow Taiwan＇s practice that adds prohibition of business strife＇s term in the Company Law in order to avoid threatens in negotiation between director and company.

关 键 词：竞业禁止 公司法 劳动法 离任董事 

分 类 号：D922.291.91[政治法律—经济法学]