基于政府不同策略普通/低碳产品制造商竞争机理研究  

Study on the Competition Mechanism of Ordinary/Low-carbon Products Manufacturer Based on Governmental Different Policies

作　　者：夏西强[1] 

机构地区：[1]郑州大学商学院,郑州450001

出　　处：《软科学》2017年第4期139-144,共6页Soft Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71472021;71301150);国家杰出青年科学基金项目(71025002);国家社会科学基金重大项目(13&ZD147);国家重点基础研究发展计划项目(2011CB013406)

摘　　要：基于消费者的购买意愿,建立了低碳产品制造商与普通产品制造商的博弈模型。基于此博弈模型,分析了政府补贴和政府宣传对低碳产品、普通产品的单位零售价格、销售量、销售利润及环境影响。研究表明:低碳产品的单位零售价格、普通产品的零售价格及需求量与政府补贴负相关,低碳产品的需求量与政府补贴正相关;低碳产品的单位零售价格与政府努力程度正相关,在政府宣传努力程度大于某一定值时,普通产品的单位零售价格与政府宣传努力程度负相关;政府采取宣传政策时,低碳产品的销售量还与生产单位低碳产品所增加的费用有关;政府采取不同策略时,对环境的影响大小与政府补贴、政府宣传努力程度及生产单位低碳产品所增加费用有关。Based on consumers＇ purchase willingness, this paper establishes a game model between low carbon products man- ufacturers and ordinary products manufacturers. It analyzes the influence of government subsidies and government propagan- da on retail price, sales profit and the sales volume of low-carbon products and ordinary products. Resuhs show that, the u- nit retail price of low carbon product and common products is negatively related to the government subsidies, demand of common products is negatively related to the government subsidies and demand of low carbon products is positively related to the government subsidies ; the unit retail price of low carbon product is positively related to the degree of efforts with the gov- ernment propaganda, the unit retail price of common products is negatively related to the government propaganda when the the degree of efforts with the government propaganda is small than some value ; sales of low-carbon products is relate to the increased cost of production units low carbon products when government adopts propaganda policy ; the size of environmental impact is relate to government subsidies, the degree of efforts with government propaganda and the increased cost of produc- tion units low carbon products when the government takes different strategies.

关 键 词：政府补贴 政府宣传 低碳产品 普通产品 博弈模型 

分 类 号：F273.2[经济管理—企业管理] F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]