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机构地区:[1]中南大学商学院,长沙410083 [2]湖南城市学院城市管理学院,湖南益阳413000
出 处:《统计与决策》2017年第6期35-39,共5页Statistics & Decision
基 金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71171203);教育部博士点基金课题(20130162110076);湖南省自然科学基金面上项目(2015JJ2024);湖南省教育厅重点项目(15A037)
摘 要:农地征收补偿争议源于关联主体对征收补偿是否公平的不同判断,化解征收补偿主体行为冲突的策略调整有赖于公平信念判断的一致性转变。文章在传统农地征收物质收益补偿的基础上,引入关联主体的互动公平信念,探讨农地征收补偿的组合性均衡定价,并进行博弈均衡分析。得出在互动公平视角下,提高征地补偿标准、增加被征地农民恶意抵抗成本、减少被征地农民在农地征收中恶意抵抗的收益回报、加强第三方监督均有助于推动农地征收的和谐进行。The disputes of farmland expropriation compensation originated from the various judgments from interrelated parties,and the dissolution of the action conflicts among all parties relied on their consistent fairness belief judgments.Based on traditional material compensation to farmland expropriation,this paper introduces the beliefs of reciprocal fairness among interrelated parties to explore the combination equilibrium evaluation during farmland expropriation compensation,and conducts the analysis of game equilibrium.The result shows that some actions such as enhancing the compensation quota,increasing the cost of malicious denials conducted by expropriated farmers,decreasing the return from malicious denials as well as strengthening third-party supervision will be helpful in propelling harmonious farmland expropriation.
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