政治关联影响下的产能过剩——来自中国民营上市公司的证据  

Excess Production Capacity under the Influence of Political Connection——Evidence from Chinese Listed Private Companies

作　　者：顾振华[1] 沈瑶[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海商学院商务经济学院,上海201400 [2]上海大学经济学院,上海200444

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2017年第4期153-160,共8页East China Economic Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71573171);上海市哲学社会科学基金青年项目(2016EJB001)

摘　　要：为什么一些生产效率落后的企业仍旧可以获得政府支持从而导致产能过剩?是什么样的因素让它们获得如此"青睐"?基于这样的思考,文章明确了产能过剩的前因后果,建立了政治关联→政府干预→产能过剩这样一条完整的路径,随后利用2003-2014年中国民营上市公司的数据,通过固定效应模型、倾向得分匹配和工具变量法检验了理论模型中的观点。研究结论表明:在其他条件不变的情况下,拥有政治关联的民营上市公司会面临更为严重的产能过剩问题;另外,民营上市公司的政治关联类型为代表委员类政治关联。Why some of firms with the backward production efficiency can still gain government support and lead to overcapacity？ What kinds of factors make them so ＂favor＂？ From this perspective, the paper clears about the antecedents and consequences of excess manufacturing capacity and constructs the mechanism among political connection, government intervention and overcapaeity. Then the paper, using the data of Chinese private listed companies from 2003 to 2014, tests the views of the theoretical model by employing fixed effects model, propensity score matching and instrumental variable method. The conclusions show that： Under the other conditions remain unchanged, private listed companies with political connection will face more serious problem of excess production capacity; In addition, the type of political connection of Chinese private listed companies is delegate-style political connection.

关 键 词：政治关联 产能过剩 代表委员类 政府干预 

分 类 号：F272.5[经济管理—企业管理] F276.5[经济管理—国民经济]