基于信息搜集的闭环供应链激励机制研究  

Study on Motivational Mechanism of Closed Loop Supply Chain Based on Information Gathering

作　　者：郭献杰 谢铁军[1] Guo Xianjie Xie Tiejun(School of Mathematics ＆ Science, University of Science ＆ Technology Beijing, Beijing 100083, China)

机构地区：[1]北京科技大学数理学院,北京100083

出　　处：《物流技术》2017年第3期162-167,共6页Logistics Technology

摘　　要：研究了内生信息结构下闭环供应链的信息搜集模型。基于委托-代理理论,建立了一个由单个制造商和单个零售商组成的供应链信息搜集激励模型。利用泛函极值理论求出了模型的解析解,并通过数值计算作了验证。得到以下结果:其一,信息搜集成本存在一个临界值,当信息搜集成本小于此临界值时,零售商会激励制造商搜集信息,否则零售商不再激励制造商搜集信息;其二,随着生产成本的增加,制造商及零售商的利润递减,市场需求量递减,产品回收量递增。In this paper, we studied the information gathering model of a closed loop supply chain with endogenous information structure. Based on the principal-agent model, we built the information gathering motivation model of a supply chain composed by a single manufacturer and a single retailer, used the functional extremeum theory to analyze the model and had it verified through a numerical example. At the end, we elaborated the findings reached in the analysis.

关 键 词：信息搜集 闭环供应链 委托代理 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] F272.92[经济管理—国民经济]