ECC计时攻击研究与仿真  

Research and simulation of timing attacks on ECC

作　　者：贾徽徽[1] 王潮[2] 顾健[1] 宋好好[1] 唐迪[1] 

机构地区：[1]公安部第三研究所,上海200031 [2]上海大学特种光纤与光接入网省部共建重点实验室,上海200072

出　　处：《网络与信息安全学报》2016年第4期56-63,共8页Chinese Journal of Network and Information Security

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助重点项目(No.61332019);国家自然科学基金资助项目(No.61572304;No.61272056);上海科委科技创新行动计划技术标准基金资助项目(No.13DZ0500501)~~

摘　　要：借助于隐马尔可夫模型思想,提出了一种针对采用"倍点—点加"点乘算法的椭圆曲线数字签名体系的一种计时攻击方法,并对美国国家标准与技术研究院(NIST)公布的二进制域上的5条Koblitz安全曲线进行了攻击仿真实验,成功地攻击了除K-571以外的其他4条Koblitz安全曲线。对于每一条安全曲线仅采集一次时间数据、耗时几十分钟就能恢复出几乎全部的密钥比特,实验结果表明,该方法实施简单、成功率高,是对当前安全曲线有较大威胁的一种侧信道攻击手段。Based on the hidden Markov model（HMM） idea, a timing attack on the elliptic curve digital signature system, which adopted the ＂double-and-add＂ scalar multiplication, was proposed. Simulation experiments on the secure Koblitz curve which released by the National Institute of Standards Technology（NIST） were implemented and four secure Koblitz curves except the K-571 were attacked successfully. The experiment results show that the attack can recover almost all the key bits in a few minutes by collecting only once time data, and is easy to implement at a high success rate.

关 键 词：侧信道攻击 计时攻击 隐马尔可夫模型 椭圆曲线密码 

分 类 号：TP309.7[自动化与计算机技术—计算机系统结构]