控股股东代理问题、现金股利与权益资本成本  

Agency Problem of Controlling Shareholder,Cash Dividends and Cost of Equity Capital

作　　者：罗琦[1] 彭梓倩 吴哲栋 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院

出　　处：《经济与管理研究》2017年第5期125-133,共9页Research on Economics and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"基于控股股东市场择时动机的公司投融资行为研究"(71272230);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划"中国上市公司权益资本成本研究"(NCET-13-0437);国家社会科学基金项目"我国上市公司股利决策与投资效率研究"(14BGL043)

摘　　要：本文基于控股股东代理问题的视角分析现金股利分配对权益资本成本的影响,并探讨这种影响在控股股东特征不同的公司中所呈现出的差异。本文以股权分置改革后2006—2011年沪、深两市A股上市公司为样本进行实证检验,发现公司支付现金股利能够显著降低权益资本成本,并且这一效果在控股股东为非国有股东以及终极控股股东两权分离的公司中表现得更为显著。本文的研究结果表明,现金股利能够作为一种有效的公司治理机制缓解控股股东代理问题,从而使得公司权益资本成本下降。Based on the perspective of agency problems between controlling and minority shareholders, this paper investigates the influence of companies＇ cash dividend distribution on the cost of equity capital, and discusses the effects on companies under different characteristics of controlling shareholders. Using a sample of Chinese listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2006 to 2011, the empirical results show that cash dividend distribution may decline the cost of equity capital. Moreover, such weakening effect is stronger when the controlling shareholder is non-state-controlled or in the companies with the separation of control rights and cash flow rights. The study indicates that cash dividends can be used as an effective internal governance mechanism to alleviate the agency problem between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders,which will result in a decline of the cost of equity capital.

关 键 词：控股股东 代理问题 现金股利 权益资本成本 

分 类 号：F275.3[经济管理—企业管理]