基于收益共享契约与Nash讨价还价公平的供应链碳减排决策  

Carbon Emission Reduction of Supply Chain Based on Revenue Sharing Contract and Nash Bargaining Fairness

作　　者：魏光兴[1] 黄湘轶 覃燕红[2] 

机构地区：[1]重庆交通大学经济与管理学院,重庆400074 [2]重庆理工大学管理学院,重庆400054

出　　处：《生态经济》2017年第5期63-68,共6页Ecological Economy

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目"基于社会偏好及其认知动态演进的供应链契约优化与协调研究"(16CGL017)

摘　　要：针对现有低碳供应链决策相关研究中忽略了公平偏好的问题,以Nash讨价还价解作为判断收益分配是否公平的参考标准,基于收益共享契约建立Stackelberg博弈模型,求解得到碳减排量和批发价格等供应链决策,并分析公平偏好的影响。研究发现,收益共享契约有利于供应链的碳减排;零售商和供应商的公平偏好都会促进碳减排;而且,公平偏好会影响收益共享契约的批发价格和收益共享比例两个参数的取值。因此,选择公平偏好较强的企业构建供应链,并根据自身和供应链伙伴公平偏好强度确定恰当的收益共享契约参数值,对促进供应链碳减排都具有重要意义。Aiming at the problem that the fairness preference has been ignored in the literatures about carbon emission reduction of supply chain, this paper develop a Stackelberg game model to gain the decisions of the carbon emission reduction and the whole sale price by introducing the Nash bargaining solution as the reference point of fairness, and the influence of fairness preference on the decisions is analyzed. It is found that both the revenue sharing contract and the fairness preference can promote carbon emission reduction of supply chain, and the fairness preference may change the parameter values including the whole sale price and the revenue sharing rate. Therefore, it is important for reducing carbon emission of supply chain to choose partners with strong fairness preference and determine the parameter values of the revenue sharing contract according to the strength of the fairness preferences.

关 键 词：收益共享契约 公平偏好 碳减排 供应链 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]