机构地区:[1]南开大学中国公司治理研究院,天津300071 [2]天津财经大学商学院,天津300222 [3]南开大学商学院,天津300071
出 处:《管理科学》2017年第2期94-105,共12页Journal of Management Science
基 金:国家自然科学基金(71533002;71572081);教育部长江学者和创新团队发展计划项目(IRT0926);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(NKZXB1239)~~
摘 要:当公司违规时对CEO及时有效地进行变更是董事会的重大决策之一,董事会作为上市公司监督和决策的重要机构,其独立性至关重要。董事会独立性是公司治理的灵魂,已有研究将董事会独立性作为一种形式上的独立性,忽略了可能影响董事会职能发挥的其他社会因素,如董事会成员与CEO非正式关系和人口统计学特征的匹配程度,因此有必要进一步探讨董事会社会独立性。采用社会网络和社会认同理论,从董事会监督职能有效性发挥角度,创新性地构建包含认知和关系双层的董事会社会独立性测量指标,以2011年至2014年沪深A股发生CEO变更的上市公司及其配对公司为样本,运用probit模型实证研究不同情景下,当公司出现违规行为时,董事会社会独立性对CEO变更的影响效应。研究结果表明,(1)董事会社会独立性越高,违规公司的CEO越容易发生变更行为,董事会成员与CEO关系亲密以及人口统计学特征相近所形成的较高的契合度使董事会无法客观公正地评判和监督CEO的业绩表现;(2)董事会社会独立性效应的发挥与上市公司的所有权性质和业绩表现有关,在民营企业和劣绩公司,董事会社会独立性的调节效应更显著;(3)良好的制度环境等外部治理机制为董事会社会独立性的效用发挥提供了保障,董事会社会独立性只有在外部治理较好的情形下才会影响违规公司的CEO变更。董事会社会独立性作为独立性研究的拓展,具有重要的理论意义和现实意义。研究结果表明提升公司治理有效性,不仅在于保持结构的独立,还需要提升董事会的社会独立性。公司应严格把控"关系型"和"相似型"CEO,同时还应创造独立良好的外部治理环境,保障董事会更好地发挥监督职能。It is one of the most important decisions of the board of directors to change CEO timely and effectively when the listed company acts in violation of regulations. Board of directors performs as an important institution for supervision and decision-mak- ing of listed companies, and its independence is crucial. Board independence is the soul of corporate governance. Previous re- searches on board independence focus on the form of independence, ignoring the possible influence of other social factors on the functions of board of directors, such as the informal relationship and the fit degree of demographic characteristics between board members and CEO. Therefore, it is necessary to further explore the board social independence. From the perspective of the effectiveness of board supervision function, and using the social network theory and social identi- ty theory, we innovatively construct the index of board social independence, which consists of both cognitive independence and relational independence. Taking A-share listed companies with CEO turnover during 2011-2014 and their paired firms as sam- pies, using the probit model to empirically study the effect of board social independence on the CEO turnover when the companies act in violation especially under different circumstances. Study found that: first, the higher the board social independence is, the higher possibility of the illegal company's CEO will be changed. The high fit degree formed between board members and CEO due to their close relationship and similar demographic characteristics, makes the board of directors can not objectively and impartially judge and supervise the performance of CEO; second, the functioning of board social independence is related to company's ownership and performance, and the moderating effect of board social independence is more significant in private enterprises and companies with bad performance ; last but not the least, external governance mechanism such as good institutional environment can play a security role on th
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