控股股东股权质押与开发支出会计政策隐性选择  

Controlling Shareholder's Share Pledging and Implicit Choice of Development Cost Accounting Policy

作　　者：谢德仁[1] 廖珂[1] 郑登津 

机构地区：[1]清华大学经济管理学院,100084

出　　处：《会计研究》2017年第3期30-38,共9页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71172010和71672098);财政部会计名家培养工程的资助

摘　　要：本文以开发支出会计政策隐性选择为切入点来观察研究控股股东股权质押对公司会计政策选择的影响及其动态变化。我们基于我国上市公司2007-2015年间的相关数据研究发现,控股股东股权质押的公司更倾向于将开发支出资本化以进行正向盈余管理,但公司内部现金流约束和高质量外部审计监督会对此有所抑制。我们进一步研究发现,随着控股股东股权质押的解除,开发支出资本化也很可能随之转为费用化,控股股东对开发支出会计政策的选择存在动态调整。此外,我们还发现,控股股东股权质押与开发支出会计政策隐性选择之间的正相关关系主要出现在非国有控股公司和高新技术公司中。The paper investigate the static and dynamic effects of controlling shareholder’s share pledging on the implicit choice of development cost accounting policy based on the data of listed firms of 2007-2015.After controlling for other factors,we find that:Compared with the firms whose controlling shareholder do not have share pledging,firms whose controlling shareholder has share pledging are more inclined to capitalize the development cost.However,the internal cash flow constraints and external auditing with high quality will weaken this relation.Further,we document that,with the termination of the controlling shareholder’s share pledging,firms would be probable to change the development cost accounting policy from capitalization method to expensing method,which is a kind of dynamic effect of controlling shareholder’s share pledging on development cost accounting policy choice.In addition,we also find that the positive relation mainly emerges in the high technology firms and non-state owned enterprises.

关 键 词：股权质押 盈余管理 市值管理 开发支出会计政策 隐性选择 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]