基于Shapley值的基础设施工程融资联盟合作机制研究  

Research on Cooperation Mechanism of Infrastructure Project Financing Alliance Based on Shapley Value

作　　者：孙蕾[1] 孙绍荣[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海理工大学管理学院,上海200093

出　　处：《工业工程与管理》2017年第2期76-82,共7页Industrial Engineering and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71171134);上海市一流学科建设项目(S1201YLXK);上海市高原学科(管理科学与工程)资助项目;沪江基金资助项目(A14006)

摘　　要：以特许经营基础设施工程为研究对象,建立了公共部门,建设及服务提供方和私人投资方的三方合作博弈模型,利用Shapley值法分析了三者在基础设施工程融资联盟中的合作收益分配问题。计算了三种融资模式下各参与方的合作收益分配值,并对不同融资联盟模式对利益分配的影响进行了分析。研究表明:如果融资联盟参与方实际承担的风险大于期望风险时,其原合作收益分配量会增加,如果小于期望风险则原合作收益分配量会减小。同时,在特许经营管理的基础设施工程融资联盟中当参与方的合作形式发生变化时,其各方所承担的实际风险会发生转移,从而影响联盟参与方的最终合作收益分配量。对于基础设施工程中融资联盟及参与方的合作机制与利益分配方式的研究对解决基础设施工程管理中的合作协调问题具有重要的启发意义和参考借鉴作用。A game model of the public sector, construction and service providers, and private investors was set up with franchise infrastructure projects as the research object. The Shapley value was applied to analyze three parties~ cooperation benefit distribution in financing infrastructure projects. Calculated cooperate benefit distribution value of participants under three financing models. Analyzed the impact of different financing model on the distribution of benefits. The result show that when the risk carried by financing alliance participants is greater than the expected risk, its original cooperation benefit distribution will increase. When the risk is less than the expected, the amount of the original distribution of cooperation benefit will decrease. Additionally, when the way of cooperation changes, actual risk in financing alliance of franchise management infrastructure projects transfers, which will affect the amount of the benefit distribution of participants. The research marks significance in solving cooperation issues in infrastructure project management.

关 键 词：合作博弈 利益分配 SHAPLEY值 融资联盟 基础设施工程 

分 类 号：F273[经济管理—企业管理]