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机构地区:[1]重庆交通大学经济与管理学院,重庆400074 [2]重庆理工大学管理学院,重庆400054
出 处:《武汉理工大学学报(信息与管理工程版)》2017年第2期217-220,226,共5页Journal of Wuhan University of Technology:Information & Management Engineering
基 金:国家社会科学基金项目(16CGL017)
摘 要:考虑供应链各主体的公平偏好特征,用Nash讨价还价解作为判断公平的参考标准,构建Stackelberg博弈模型,求解得到了碳减排量、批发价格和零售价格等最优决策,分析了公平偏好对供应链碳减排与定价决策的影响。研究表明:公平偏好会降低批发价格和零售价格,但供应商公平偏好的影响非常小且不单调;公平偏好会减少供应链碳减排量,而且零售商和供应商的公平偏好对供应链碳减排量的降低都非常显著。By considering the fairness preference of every members in supply chain,this paper developed a Stackelberg game model to gain the decisions of the carbon emission reduction,the whole sale price and retail price by introducing the Nash bargaining solution as the reference point of fairness,and the influence of fairness preference on the decisions is analyzed. It is found that the fairness preference can reduce the whole sale price and the retail price,where the effect of the supplier is very weak and not monotonous. However,the fairness preference also may reduce the quantity of carbon emission reduction,where the effect of both the retailer and the supplier is significant.
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