政府项目或资金支持状态下产业技术创新战略联盟的利益分配博弈研究  

Study on Game of Interest Distribution of Industrial Technology Innovation Strategy Alliance Supported by Governmental Programs or Funds

作　　者：郭霖麟[1] 夏维力[1] 白礼彪[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]西北工业大学管理学院,西安710129 [2]长安大学建筑工程学院,西安710061

出　　处：《世界科技研究与发展》2017年第2期129-133,共5页World Sci-Tech R&D

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71201124);教育部人文社会科学研究项目(16YJA630068);陕西省软科学研究计划项目(2016KRM053)资助

摘　　要：建立合理的利益分配机制是产业技术创新战略联盟取得成功的关键。针对当前政府深入参与联盟技术创新过程以及对联盟成员影响日益加深的情况,本文通过构建利益分配博弈模型,探究在政府项目或资金支持状态下产业技术创新战略联盟的利益分配机制。研究结果显示,政府项目支持能够促使联盟成员形成合作决策的均衡状态,政府资金支持则易于助长联盟成员的投机行为,不利于联盟的发展。政府在支持产业联盟发展过程中,应考虑采取项目支持的方式,以项目带动产学研合作。To establish and perfect the interest distribution mechanism is fundamental to the success of industrial technology innovation strategy alliance. In view of the current situation where the government is deeply involved in the innovation process of alliances and exerts ever greater impacts over alliance members, interest distribution game model is established to probe into the interest distribution mechanism of the industrial technology innovation strategy alliance supported by the gov- ernmental programs or funds. The research shows that the support of governmental programs are instrnmental to balanced de- cision - making of the alliance. The support of governmental funds are favo,＇able to the speculation of the members, so it is unfavorable to the growth of the alliance. During the process of providing support to promote industrial alliances, the govern- ment shall consider adopting appropriate approaches that rely upon specific projects, which shall be conducive for facilitating cooperation between alliance members.

关 键 词：产业技术创新战略联盟 政府 利益分配 博弈论 

分 类 号：F273.1[经济管理—企业管理] F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]