闭环供应链下收益共享契约机制策略研究  

Optimization research of revenue sharing contract mechanism in closed-loop supply chain

作　　者：谢家平[1] 梁玲[1] 李燕雨 李仲[1] XIE Jia-ping LIANG-Ling LI Yan-yu LI Zhong(School of International Business Administration, Shanghai University of Finance ＆ Economics, shanghai 20043)

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学国际工商管理学院,上海200433

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2017年第2期185-193,共9页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71272015);上海市哲学社会科学规划课题(2014BGL007);上海财经大学研究生科研创新基金资助项目(CXJJ-2013-357)

摘　　要：收益共享契约为供应链合作提供了可行机制并广泛被用于实践,是否可以将之融入到逆向供应链系统中,在分配正向销售收益的同时,对逆向回收收益进行分配呢?这是闭环供应链协调实践中目前关注的热点问题。本文面对无消费偏好市场下,将收益共享契约应用到由单一制造商-单一零售商组成的闭环供应链系统。考虑制造商委托零售商回收的组织方式,分析从销售到回收再制造进而再销售的全过程,进行正逆两阶段的供应链收益共享契约优化研究。针对不同批发价情景下,重点研究正逆供应链分成比例对于制造商和零售商的利润最大化策略的影响,解决无消费偏好市场下分散决策的收益分配协调问题。Revenue-sharing contract （RSC） is a feasible method to coordinate forward supply chains. Is it also possible to incorporate RSC into reverse supplychains to allocate both forward and reverse revenues among participants simultaneously？ This is an extensively researched issue in the application of theclosed-loop supply chain （CLSC）. In this article, we apply RSC to an ＇one-manufacturer- and-one-retailer＇ CLSC system under a market with preference-freeconsumers. We analyze the impact of retailer＇s share percentage of revenue and cost saving on the decision of for-profit manufacturers and retailers in a CLSCat different wholesale prices, and then solve the coordination problem of the decentralized CLSC. The mannfacturer/remanufacturer and the retailer should notonly share demand information in product market （the relation between quantity and price of products）, which is necessary for them to allocate revenue at l,but also share used products information （the quantity, quality and price of used products）, which is necessary to assure cost saving can be distributed betweenthem at φ2. To construct a RSC for a CLSC is to decide the optimal share percentages of both forward and reverse revenues. This article explores optimal forward andreverse share percentages as well as purchasing quantity with different market dominators. First, the manufacturer ofien provides its retailer free product toexpand market share. We design a zero-wholesale-price RSC. In a manufacturer-dominated CLSC, a manufacturer decides the retailer＇s share percentage ofrevenue and cost saving, which are l and φ2, and the retailer decides purchase quantity Q. We use backward deduction to solve them. Secondly, consideringnon-zero production cost and bargaining power, the manufacturer could not provide products for free in most situations, which means the wholesale price co： 0.In this case, we discuss two decision sequences. One decision sequence takes place in retailer-dominated CLSC in which retailer first decides revenue s

关 键 词：闭环供应链 契约优化 收益共享 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]