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作 者:贾兴洪[1,2] 海峰[1] 董瑞[3] JIA Xinghong HAI Feng DONG Rui(School of Economics and Management, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China School of Economics and Management, Henan Institute of Science and Technology, Xinxiang 453003, China Institute of Systems Engineering, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China)
机构地区:[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉430072 [2]河南科技学院经济与管理学院,河南新乡453003 [3]武汉大学系统工程研究所,湖北武汉430072
出 处:《计算机集成制造系统》2017年第4期903-912,共10页Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems
基 金:国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(71231007)~~
摘 要:为解决车货匹配平台中用户多平台接入问题、提升平台匹配效率和平台企业价值,基于双边市场理论和演化博弈理论,通过构建车货匹配平台双边用户交易博弈模型,探讨了平台用户从多归属向单归属演化的控制问题。研究结果表明,车货匹配平台作为控制方,对交易中的单归属用户给予减免交易费、补偿机会收益损失,可以诱导多归属用户向单归属用户演化。进而讨论了控制量与演化稳定策略的关系,设计了促进平台用户单归属比率提升的最优控制,并通过仿真展示了最优控制率与最优控制轨迹。To raise the single-homing user ratio of vehicles and cargos matching platform and enhance the platform matching efficiency and the value of platform enterprise, the bargaining game model of two-sided users was con- structed based on two-sided market theory and evolutionary game theory, and the control process of evolution from multi-homing users to single-homing users was discussed. Research showed that the platform enterprise as the con- troller could induce this evolution process by reducing transaction fees and compensating loss of opportunity income. The relationship between control quantity and evolutionary stable strategy was discussed, and the optimal control for promotion of single-homing users ratio was designed. The optimal control rate and the optimal control trajectory were showed with simulation.
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