成熟时期莱布尼茨哲学中的个体化原则及其困难  

The Principle of Individuation and Problems of Leibnizian Philosophy

作　　者：王成军[1] WANG Chengjun(Zhongnan University of Economics ＆ La)

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学哲学院,湖北武汉430073

出　　处：《武汉大学学报（人文科学版）》2017年第2期49-58,共10页Wuhan University Journal (Humanity Sciences)

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(14YJC720025)

摘　　要：个体是莱布尼茨哲学的基石,个体化问题因此也是莱布尼茨哲学的重要问题。在其成熟时期的哲学中,"个别化的知觉+个别化的欲望",即"整个实体"被莱布尼茨视为单子个体化的原则。然而,尽管这一主张并不是一个"空的陈述",但它不仅不具备莱布尼茨自己所要求的普遍的解释力,而且,作为一个内在的原则,它对单子的个体化解释也是不充足的,仍然需要一个外在的原则即上帝来进行说明。在这个意义上,莱布尼茨对个体化原则的探求整体上是不够成功的。＂Individual＂is a central concept for Leibnizian Philosophy,and the problem of individuation is therefore a very importantissueinLeibniz.Inhismaturephilosophy,Leibniz tends to see＂the whole entity＂,i.e.,individuated perception plus individuated appetition as the principle of individuation for Monads which are seen as the true individuals in his mature philosophy.Although we could acknowledge that this claim is not a null statement,this Leibnizian principle of individuation has to be facing with some theoretical troubles.That is,by appealing to ＂the whole entity＂,Leibniz can not provide an universal explanation which he himself has sought for all substances,but an ad hoc explanation for immaterial substances alone;and,even though it signifies an internal principle of being,the principle＂the whole entity＂can not provide a sufficient reason even for a Monad＇s individuation and therefore an external principle,i.e.,God is still needed to be a part of this solution.In this sense,Leibniz has never been totally successful in seeking aprinciple of individuation in his mature philosophy.

关 键 词：莱布尼茨 个体化原则 单子 整个实体 

分 类 号：B516[哲学宗教—外国哲学]