人是不是自然世界的例外?——从斯宾诺莎对霍布斯自然权利学说的批评说起  

Transgression of Being: Is Man an exception of Nature?

作　　者：吴增定[1] WU Zeng-ding(Peking University , Beijing 100871 , China)

机构地区：[1]北京大学,北京100871

出　　处：《云南大学学报（社会科学版）》2017年第3期5-12,共8页The Journal of Yunnan University:Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目"国家理性:从马基雅维里到黑格尔"(项目号:13JJD720002)的阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：本文的主要任务是探讨斯宾诺莎对于霍布斯的自然权利学说的批评。斯宾诺莎的自然权利学说虽然继承了霍布斯的相关思想,但却批评了后者的不彻底性。斯宾诺莎认为,霍布斯没有将他的反目的论精神贯彻到底,因此不能融贯地解释人的自然状态以及自然法。斯宾诺莎从"自然的同质性"原则出发,将人的自然状态和自然法等思想彻底地"去道德化",认为人的世界并不是自然世界整体的例外,并且把权利等同于权力和力量,从而合理地解决了霍布斯的困难。但是斯宾诺莎的哲学仍然认为,人凭借理性在自然世界中占有某种特殊的地位,因此他仍然预设了人是自然世界的例外。This paper focuses on Spinoza's critique of Hobbes' doctrine of natural right. Though Spinoza's doctrine of natural right has inherited some elements of Hobbes' relevant theory,Spinoza criticizes Hobbes for his imperfect theory. According to Spinoza,Hobbes has not radicalized his interpretation of immorality in the state of Nature prior to human society. Spinoza holds that the state of Nature is a state without good and evil,and the right of Nature,that is,the right of self-preservation of conatus is not limited to man,but is valid for all finite modes. Therefore,in Spinoza's political philosophy,right is equal to power.However,Spinoza's philosophy gives priority to man over other things on account of his reason so that he regards man as an exception of Nature in the end.

关 键 词：自然权利 自然法 力量 契约 

分 类 号：B512.3[哲学宗教—外国哲学]