考虑供应商服务与零售商退货的定价博弈分析  

Pricing Game Analysis with Vendor Service and Retailer Return

作　　者：李兴国[1] 李方纬 

机构地区：[1]合肥工业大学过程优化与智能决策教育部重点实验室,安徽合肥230009 [2]合肥工业大学管理学院,安徽合肥230009

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2017年第8期19-25,共7页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71301040);安徽省软科学项目(1502052014;1502052016);安徽省哲学社会科学重点研究基地重点项目(SK2013A148);中国博士后科学基金项目(2013M54165;2014T70508);江苏省博士后科技活动计划项目(1302129C)

摘　　要：研究由一个供应商和一个零售商组成的二级供应链,由供应商提供产品服务,零售商制定产品零售价,在一个销售周期结束后存在零售商向供应商的退货,退货产生的物流成本由零售商与供应商通过博弈的方式共同分担.基于博弈理论,建立了供应商和零售商以各自利润最大化为目标,以服务水平、零售价和退货为主要影响因素的Nash和Stackelberg博弈.采用数值方法,对这两个博弈进行了求解.得到供应商为零售商分担退货物流成本最优比例、供应商最优服务水平和零售商最优定价策略.研究表明,Nash博弈时的解是唯一的,此时供应商不会分担退货物流成本;Stackelberg博弈时,供应商分担退货物流成本比例依据批发价大小而定.Considering a two-stage logistics supply chain consisting of one vendor and one retailer. The vendor provides product services, the retailer makes retail price. After a sales cycle, the cost of the retailer to the vendor＇s return shared by them through the game. The mathematical models for maximizing the profit between the vendor and the retailer are es- tablished. In the models, service level, retail price and return are the main influential factors. Then the numerical method is used to evaluate the optimal services, optimal pricing and op- timal share rate. An initial study conducted in this paper shows that the vendor will not share the cost of return in the Nash game; the rate of vendor shared the cost of the return for retailer depends on the retail price in the Stacklberg game.

关 键 词：退货 零售价 服务供应链 Nash/Stackelberg均衡 供应/零售商 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] F274F724.2