需求不确定下考虑策略乘客的航空公司模糊销售机制  

Opaque Selling Mechanism for Airlines with Strategic Passengers of Demand Uncertainty

作　　者：谭美容[1,2] 李豪[1] TAN Meirong LI Hao(School of Economics and Management, Chongqing Jiaotong University, Chongqing 400074, China School of Economics, Rongzhi College of Chongqing Technology and Business University, Chongqing 401320, China)

机构地区：[1]重庆交通大学经济与管理学院,重庆400074 [2]重庆工商大学融智学院经济学院,重庆401320

出　　处：《工业工程》2017年第2期19-25,共7页Industrial Engineering Journal

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年资助项目(71402012);重庆市研究生科研创新资助项目(CYS16188)

摘　　要：研究需求不确定下乘客策略行为对航空公司收益的影响。在航空客运机票销售过程中引入模糊销售机制,通过建立Hotelling模型,得出了两航空公司在传统销售和模糊销售机制下的市场最优价格、市场占有率以及期望收益。最后利用算例分析了航空公司在传统销售与模糊销售下的收益差异,发现模糊销售机制能有效的缓解乘客的策略行为,提高航空公司的收益。The effect of passenger strategic behavior on the revenue of airlines when demand is uncertain is studied. The opaque selling mechanism is introduced to the ticket sale process. A Hotelling model is proposed and the optimal price obtained, with market coverage and expected revenue of airlines with two mechanisms discussed. Finally, numerical experiments are presented to analyze the difference of two mechanisms. And it is found that opaque selling can ease the passenger strategic behavior and enhance the airlines＇ profit.

关 键 词：模糊销售 策略行为 HOTELLING模型 需求不确定 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]