供应链赊销交易中的契约协调和意愿研究  

A Study of the Contract Coordination and Willingness with Trade Credit in Supply Chain

作　　者：颜锦江[1] 程红[2] 汪贤裕[1] 

机构地区：[1]四川大学商学院 [2]成都理工大学管理科学学院

出　　处：《四川大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2017年第2期107-114,共8页Journal of Sichuan University：Philosophy and Social Science Edition

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金资助项目"双方信息不对称下的供应链赊销交易激励契约和风险控制"(14YJC630020);四川大学中央高校基本科研业务经费研究专项资助项目"共享经济政府规制及其商业模式创新研究"(skqy201721)

摘　　要：在市场需求不确定的情形下,为了控制赊销风险和提高供应链效率,对赊销交易中的协调契约和交易双方的协调意愿进行研究。考虑有一定保值性的产品的部分赊销,采用报童模型对实践中常用的批发价格契约进行讨论。结果表明,赊销交易中的批发价格契约可以协调供应链,且供销双方均愿意在该契约下进行赊销交易而非现金交易,协调价格受到产品保值性的影响。In order to control trade credit risk and improve supply chain efficiency, this study focuses on coordination contract and coordination willingness of both players in trade credit in the case of uncertain market demand. Considering the partial trade credit and the remaining products’ residual value beyond sales period, the Newsvendor Model is adopted to analyze the wholesale-price contract which is popular in practice. Results show that the wholesale-price contract can coordinate the supply chain under trade credit, and both the retailer and supplier prefer trade credit to trade in cash under this contract. The contract is affected by the residual value. Finally, a numerical example is given to verify conclusions.

关 键 词：供应链 赊销交易 报童模型 协调 赊销意愿 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]