不同公平偏好模型下基于批发价格契约的供应链协调  

Supply Chain Coordination with Wholesale Price Contract and Fairness-concerned Agents

作　　者：陈戈[1] 但斌[1] 覃燕红[2] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030 [2]重庆理工大学管理学院,重庆400054

出　　处：《预测》2017年第3期62-68,共7页Forecasting

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年资助项目(16CGL017)

摘　　要：本文分别在随机需求和确定需求条件下,研究了零售商采用FS公平偏好模型和BO公平偏好模型时零售商公平偏好行为对最优订货量、零售价格、供应商利润、零售商利润和供应链协调性的影响。研究得出,批发价格契约不能实现确定需求条件下的供应链协调,但是却能够协调随机需求条件下的供应链,且当需求为确定的线性需求函数时,无论零售商的公平偏好强度如何,供应链的总利润都不改变,零售商的公平偏好行为仅改变了供应链成员之间的利润分配,从而起到渠道利润分配机制的作用。此外,零售商倾向于采用FS公平偏好模型,而供应商希望零售商选择BO公平偏好模型。Based on the FS and BO fairness-concerned models, we investigate the impact of retailer＇ s fairness concern on the optimal order quantity, the optimal retail price, the supplier＇ s profit, the retailer＇ s profit and the supply chain coordination condition with stochastic and deterministic demand, respectively. We find that even the wholesale price contract can＇ t coordinate the supply chain with deterministic demand, it can coordinate the supply chain with stochastic demand. The total profit of the supply chain does not change with respect to the degree of fairness of the retailer when demand is linear. At this time, the retailer＇ s fairness concern plays a role of splitting the total profit among the supply chain members. In addition, we find that the retailer prefers the FS fairness concern model, while the supplier prefers the BO fairness model.

关 键 词：FS模型 BO模型 公平偏好 批发价格契约 供应链协调 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]