大股东控制、异地财务独董与公司创新——基于创业板上市公司的经验证据  

Large Shareholder Control,Nonlocal Financial Independent Director and Company's Innovation

作　　者：杨风[1] 吴晓晖[2] 

机构地区：[1]桂林医学院人文与管理学院 [2]厦门大学管理学院

出　　处：《财会通讯（下）》2017年第5期111-115,共5页Communication of Finance and Accounting

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目"多边代理视角下创业企业的激励机制及管理权转移研究"(项目编号:71572167);国家自然科学基金资助项目"多边代理关系下新创企业的治理机制与竞争行为研究"(项目编号:71172056)的阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：以深圳证券交易市场2009-2014年创业板上市公司为研究样本,检验了大股东控制、异地财务独董与公司创新之间的关系。实证检验的结果显示:大股东持股比例与公司研发投资之间显著负相关,表明我国上市公司存在大股东治理问题,抑制了公司的创新。进一步,在区分是否聘请异地财务独董的情况下,研究显示,异地财务独董对大股东持股比例和研发投资的关系产生了显著影响,促进了公司的创新。表明异地财务独董能够起到一定的监督治理作用。Based on the data,from 2009 to 2014,on the GEM listed companies,we have,in this article,explored the relationship between the nonlocal financial independent director,the large shareholder control and the company's innovation.Empirical test shows that the proportion of large shareholders is significantly negatively related to the R&D investment,which implies that there is the large shareholder governance problem on the listed companies from china,and the large shareholder inhibited company's innovation.Furthermore,distinguishing of the existence of the nonlocal financial independent director,the study shows that,the nonlocal financial independent has a significant impact on the relationship between the proportion of large shareholders and the R&D investment,and can promote company's innovation.The result implies that the nonlocal financial independent director can play a certain supervision role in corporate governance.

关 键 词：大股东控制 异地财务独董 研发投资 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理] F273.1[经济管理—国民经济] F275