知识论证的三大困境  

Three Predicaments of Knowledge Argument

作　　者：何冬玲[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学哲学学院,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《长沙理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2017年第3期41-46,共6页Journal of Changsha University of Science and Technology：Social Science

摘　　要：物理主义和反物理主义围绕现象意识展开了一系列讨论,知识论证试图证明有关现象意识的事实是非物理的现象事实,而物理事实和知识是关于整个世界的完整描述的物理主义观点是错误的。但是,以下论证揭示了知识论证所面临的不可回避的困境:经验现象或感质本身的合理性受到了质疑;关于经验现象的知识不能通过物理知识获得的观点也是不成立的;能力假说直接反驳了知识论证是合理可行的,否定了现象事实和现象知识具有独立的本体论地位,指出主体在意识经验中获得了新的能力。Physicalism and anti--physicalism develop a series of discussions. Knowledge argument tries to prove that facts of phenomenal consciousness are non-- physically phenomenal facts, while the idea of the physiealism that we can describe the whole world with physical facts and knowledge is false. In the argument of the article yet, we can easily find that the premises of the knowledge argument face with the inevitable predicaments. There is doubt about the existence of empirical phenomena or qualia; the idea that empirical phenomena cannot deduce from the physical fact is false; ability hypothesis rebuts the knowledge argument directly, and it also denies that phenomenal facts and phenomenal knowledge have independent ontological status, and suggests that people acquire abilities.

关 键 词：经验现象 知识论证 能力假说 

分 类 号：N031[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]