食品生产监管的博弈分析及建议  

Analysis and Suggestion on Food Production and Regulation

作　　者：李鑫[1] 马国顺[2] 孙冰 

机构地区：[1]西安航空学院理学院,陕西西安710077 [2]西北师范大学数学与统计学院甘肃兰州730070 [3]西安市长安第一中学,陕西西安710100

出　　处：《甘肃科学学报》2017年第3期14-18,共5页Journal of Gansu Sciences

摘　　要：根据我国食品生产市场的实际情况,运用演化博弈思想讨论政府监督机构和食品生产企业的博弈问题。建立了两个食品生产监管的博弈模型,从复制动态系统中计算出两种状态下的演化均衡点,讨论各个参数对演化结果的影响。其中,增加监管部门收益、降低监管成本、加大违法企业惩处力度等措施可以有效地提高政府部门的监管效率,使我国的食品生产市场不断地向规范良性的方向演化。Based on production market practical situation of our food, game playing problem of government supervisory organization and food production is discussed in this text with evolution and gambling idea, building gambling model of producing and supervisory two kind foods.Evolution break-even point was cal- culated under two status from copying dynamical system,discussing the effect of each parameter on evolu- ting result.Thereinto,improving income of supervisory department, reducing supervisory cost and increas- ing penalties for illegal enterprises and other measures can effectively improve supervisory efficiency of government sector, promoting our food production market more standard and well-behaved.

关 键 词：演化稳定策略 复制动态方程 纳什均衡 食品安全 

分 类 号：F830.9[经济管理—金融学]