环境税制下政府与污染企业演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Governments and Polluting Firms Considering Environmental Tax Regulation

作　　者：陈真玲[1] 王文举[2] 

机构地区：[1]河南财经政法大学经济学院/中原经济区"三化"协调发展河南省协同创新中心,郑州450046 [2]北京物资学院,北京101149

出　　处：《管理评论》2017年第5期226-236,共11页Management Review

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目(14ZDA072);本文系河南省哲学社会科学规划项目阶段性成果(2016BJJ070);河南省科技厅软科学项目(172400410099);河南财经政法大学重点学科建设项目

摘　　要：在环境税制背景下,从微观主体的收益函数出发,本文构建了中央政府与地方政府的委托代理模型、政府与污染企业的演化博弈模型,并对三者的利益互动博弈关系进行了仿真模拟和深入分析,从中探究合理的环境税征收的设计机制。研究结果表明:(1)在环境税的监管机制下,当政府补贴大于企业减排成本时,政府与污染企业的博弈稳定策略实现了帕累托最优。(2)随着中央政府对地方政府税收共享比例的提高,地方政府对污染企业的监管力度也会加大,因此制定合理的环境税共享比例有助于调动地方政府积极性,从而实现污染企业节能减排。(3)加大监管力度和提高环境税率将会促进污染企业减少排放,但是一旦监管力度下降,即使提高环境税率,污染企业不会全部采取减排策略。污染企业将出现两极分化,一部分企业选择不减排策略,另一部分企业选择减排策略。因此制定严格的环境污染监督机制势必将推动污染企业积极减排、促进经济绿色发展。Based on the game theory, this paper constructs two revenue functions of micro subject models ： the principal-agent model relating to the central government and local governments, and the evolutionary game model relating to the government and pollution enterprises. We also analyze and simulate their intrinsic interest relations in the relation among the central ＆local governments and the enterprises. The reason findings show that： Firstly, the evolutionary stable strategy between the governments and polluting finns can achieve the Pareto optimality in the condition of environmental tax when the subsidy is greater than the cost. Secondly, it is significant to increase the share ration of tax revenue between the central and local governments which can improve the local government＇ s supervision of pollu- tion firms. Thirdly, when we strengthen environmental regulation and increase environmental tax, pollution emission will decrease. How- ever, once environmental regulation is relaxing, polluting firms will not adopt pollution abatement strictly though we increase environmental tax. polluting firms will have two choices ： Some finns are unwilling to reduce pollution, others will choose the strategy of pollution reduction. So, it is important to stipulate the reasonable mechanism of environmental tax which can promote actively pollution abatement of firms, and economic green development.

关 键 词：环境税 委托代理模型 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] F812.45[环境科学与工程—环境科学] X196