高管薪酬激励对股权代理成本影响的实证研究  

An Empirical Study of the Impacts of Executive Compensation Incentive upon the Equity Agency Cost

作　　者：朱德胜[1] 张伟[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东财经大学会计学院,山东济南250014

出　　处：《经济与管理评论》2017年第3期68-74,共7页Review of Economy and Management

基　　金：教育部规划基金项目"收益信息披露对非专业投资者认知决策影响研究"(项目编号:15YJAZH114)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：根据代理理论,股权代理成本可以细分为股东与管理者之间的利益冲突而引起的第一类股权代理成本和控股股东与中小股东之间的利益冲突而引起的第二类股权代理成本。本文利用我国A股上市公司2010—2015年的数据,检验了高管薪酬激励对股东与管理者之间的第一类股权代理成本的影响。研究发现,高管的现金薪酬与第一类股权代理成本呈U型关系;而高管的权益薪酬与第一类股权代理成本呈显著的负相关关系。在高管薪酬制度的改革中,不能只片面的追求高管薪酬水平的高低,而应当综合考虑高管薪酬的激励效果。According to agency theory, equity agency costs can be subdivided into the first class, agency costs caused by conflict of interest between shareholders and managers, and the second class, agency costs between controlling shareholder and minority shareholde- rs. This paper takes China＇s 2010-2015 A-share listed companies as samples to examine the effect of executive compensation incentive on the first class agency costs between shareholders and managers. The research shows that there is a U-shaped relationship between executive cash pay and the first class agency costs, but a significant negative correlation between executive equity pay and the first class agency costs. In the reform of the system of executive compensation, we should not only pursue the level of executive compensation, but also consider the incentive effect of executive compensation.

关 键 词：高管薪酬 激励高管 现金薪酬 高管持股 比例 股权代理 成本 

分 类 号：F23[经济管理—会计学]