董事高管责任保险与企业风险承担:理论路径与经验证据  

D&O Insurance and Corporate Risk-Taking:Theoretical and Empirical Analysis

作　　者：胡国柳[1] 胡珺[2] 

机构地区：[1]海南大学经济与管理学院,570228 [2]暨南大学管理学院,510632

出　　处：《会计研究》2017年第5期40-46,共7页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71562010)的资助

摘　　要：董事高管责任保险对管理者财产风险存在"兜底"效应,有助于缓解管理者的风险规避等代理冲突,但同时也可能导致管理者自利成本降低从而诱发潜在的道德风险。为此,本文以2007-2013年中国A股上市公司为样本,考察了董事高管责任保险对企业风险承担的影响并对其作用机制进行了检验。研究发现,引入董事高管责任保险有助于增加企业风险承担;在控制了内生性等问题之后,该结论依然成立。对作用机制的分析表明,董事高管责任保险主要通过"激励效应"提升企业风险承担,而"道德风险效应"没有得到支持。本文是基于企业风险承担视角对董事高管责任保险的首次研究尝试,对于深入理解董事高管责任保险在资本市场中的作用角色具有重要意义。With the purchase of D&O insurance,whether it decreases the agency conflict,or lead to moral hazard because of less self-behavior cost? Our paper based on Chinese listed companies from 2007 to 2013,analyzes the relationships between D&O insurance and corporate risk-taking. We found that,with the introduction of D&O insurance,the risk-taking of corporations will obviously increase,after the endogenous problems had been controlled,the above-mentioned conclusion is still correct. Further affect channel tests show that,the D&O insurance impact on corporate risk-taking by means of'incenting effect',but not support'moral hazard effect'. We did the first research attempt which based on the perspective of corporate risk-taking for analysis enterprise government effect hold by the D&O insurance,which deepen the understanding of D&O insurance' s positive effects in corporate government.

关 键 词：董事高管责任保险 企业风险承担 激励 道德风险 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理] F272.3[经济管理—国民经济] F842.69