中央巡视工作是否提高了企业业绩——基于准自然实验的证据  

Does the Central Inspection Campaign Improve the Firm Performance： Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment in China

作　　者：王砾[1] 王茂斌[2] 孔东民[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学经济学院 [2]对外经济贸易大学金融学院

出　　处：《金融学季刊》2017年第2期30-55,共26页Quarterly Journal of Finance

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71372130;71173078);中央组织部“万人计划”青年拔尖人才计划的资助

摘　　要：本文以中共十八大以来中央高强度反腐败行动为背景，将2013年的中央巡视组巡视工作视为政府在全国范围内实行的一项准自然实验，采用双重差分方法和倾向得分匹配方法研究了此次巡视工作对不同产权性质企业的业绩影响差异。研究发现：从短期来看，中央巡视工作会促进中央国企业绩上升，但会阻碍非国有企业的业绩上升；进一步用超额招待费分组验证了这一结论，反映了腐败对中央国企起到了“沙子”作用，而对非国有企业起到的是“润滑剂”作用；最后用安慰剂检验发现结果稳健。本文从巡视政策评估的角度为当前“简政放权”，发挥市场资源配置的基础性作用，从而降低腐败作为企业润滑剂的必要性提供了新的实证证据。Based on the fact that China has adopted a high-intensive anti-corruption campaign since the 18th Party Congress in China, this paper treats the central inspection campaign in 2013 as a quasi-natural experiment, using the difference-in-difference（DID） and propensity score matching （PSM） methods to explore the effect of anti-corruption on firm performance from the perspective of ownership. The results show that in the short term, the central inspection campaign contributes to improving the performance of central state-owned enterprises（SOEs） ~ However, it would in turn hinder the performance of the non-state-owned enterprises （non-SOEs）. By grouping excess entertainment expenses, we further confirm our conclusion, which demonstrates corruption act as ＂sand＂ in central SOEs while ＂greasing-wheel＂ in non-SOEs. Additionally, a placebo test helps ensure that the results are robust. From the view of policy evaluation, this paper is in support of curbing the power of bureaucrats, reining in government spending and playing a key role in the allocation of resources, sequentially reducing the necessity of ＂greasing-wheel＂ effects of corruption.

关 键 词：中央巡视组 准自然实验 企业业绩 双重差分法 倾向得分匹配法 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]