基于最优贷款利率选择的互联网金融进入博弈分析  

Game analysis on entry of internet finance based on optimal selection of loan interest rates

作　　者：王艳[1] 杨灵[2] 

机构地区：[1]中共沈阳市委党校经济学教研部,沈阳110036 [2]沈阳工业大学经济学院,沈阳110870

出　　处：《沈阳工业大学学报（社会科学版）》2017年第3期230-235,共6页Journal of Shenyang University of Technology(Social Sciences)

摘　　要：通过一个两阶段博弈模型,研究传统商业银行作为潜在进入者进入互联网金融业务时,与在位者博弈过程中的最优借贷利率选择问题。得到两个关键性发现:在贷款利率决定阶段,对于互联网金融潜在进入者,其贷款利率与参与到互联网金融中的战略替代程度、高风险状态下在位者的参与水平以及低风险下的竞争程度都是负相关的。潜在进入者的参与水平与在位者的战略互补程度以及竞争过程中的风险识别程度呈正相关关系。因而对互联网金融潜在进入者而言,进入与否依赖于其是否具备丰富的战略管理经验以及对风险状态的高度识别能力。Through a two-stage game model, the issue of optimal selection of loan interest rates is studied of traditional commercial banks as potential entrants into internet finance during the game with incumbents. Two key discoveries are acquired：In the decision stage of loan interest rate, the loan interest rate and the strategic substitution level in intemet finance, the participation level of incumbents with high-risk and the level of competition with low-risk of internet financial potential entrants are negatively correlated. The participation level of potential entrants and complementary strategic level of incumbents and the degree of risk identification in competitive process are positively correlated. Hence, whether the potential entrants of internet finance enter or not depends on rich experience of strategic management and the high recognition ability of risk status.

关 键 词：互联网金融 潜在进入者 最优贷款利率 商业银行 沉没成本 竞争程度 博弈分析 

分 类 号：F062.5[经济管理—政治经济学]